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COLLOQUIUM
THE SEC'S UNFINISHED SOFT INFORMATION
REVOLUTION
JOEL SELIGMAN*
INTRODUCTIONTHE transformation of the Securities and Exchange Commission's
mandatory disclosure system represents the single most important
development in the agency's greater than sixty years' experience ad-
ministering disclosure requirements. Since the early 1970s, the SEC
has shifted its emphasis from historical or "hard" information to its
current emphasis on forward-looking information.' This transforma-
tion can be termed the "soft information revolution" in the SEC's
mandatory disclosure system. In terms of investor protection, the
SEC's emphasis on forward-looking information has significantly im-
proved the quality of what is mandatorily disclosed.2
The SEC has developed standards, buttressed by a single, limited
safe harbor rule, regarding prospective statements.3 The development
of several different hortatory and mandatory standards, however, has
led to complexities in the enforcement of the Commission's forward-
looking rules and guides. In October 1994, the Commission acknowl-
edged these complexities when it issued a concept release and an-
nounced public hearings on current practices relating to the disclosure
of forward-looking information.4
This Article examines the SEC's approach to disclosure of forward-
looking statements, and suggests that the SEC issue an interpretative
* Professor of Law, The University of Michigan Law School.
1. There is a substantial literature concerning soft information or forward-look-
ing statements. For relevant citations, see 2 Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Securities
Regulation 622 n.66 (3d ed. 1989).
2. See, eg., Grace Pownall et al., The Stock Price Effects of Alternative Types of
Management Earnings Forecasts, 68 Acct. Rev. 896 (1993) (citing to an extensive
literature).
3. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175, 240.3b-6 (1994).
4. Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Exchange Act Release No.
34,831 [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) j 85,436, at 85,778 (Oct.
13, 1994).
In the concluding substantive paragraphs of this release, the Commission may have
invited discussion of legislative proposals. Id. at 85,792-93. Subsequently, SEC Chair-
man Levitt indicated that he would prefer not to seek new legislation to address pri-
vate securities litigation at this time. Levitt Says No Plans to Seek Legislation to
Reform Litigation, 26 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 1503 (Nov. 11, 1994).
This Article is limited to analysis of SEC administrative approaches to problems
posed by forward-looking statements. Elsewhere, I have addressed the merits of sev-
eral legislative proposals that were introduced in the 103d Congress. Joel Seligman,
The Implications of Central Bank, 49 Bus. Law. 1429, 1445-46 & n.92 (1994).
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release to guide registrants in this arena. Part I of this Article consid-
ers the evolution of the Commission's current rules and guides with
respect to prospective statements. Part II addresses the disclosure of
risk factors and assumptions to accompany forward-looking state-
ments. This part first discusses the judiciary's approach to such disclo-
sure through application of the bespeaks caution doctrine. This part
then suggests that the Commission issue a detailed interpretative re-
lease similar to releases it has issued with respect to municipal securi-
ties.5 Such a release would outline how issuers and registrants might,
in various specified circumstances, disclose the risks and assumptions
underlying forward-looking statements. This part also identifies other
approaches that the SEC might adopt to guide issuers and registrants
with respect to prospective statements and argues that these alterna-
tives are inferior to an interpretative release.
I. THr COMMISSION's FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENT RULES
AND GUIDES
A. Hortatory Forward-Looking Statements
The Commission currently "encourages ... management's projec-
tions of future economic performance that have a reasonable basis
and are presented in an appropriate format."' 6 As exhorted in Item
10(b) of Regulation S-K, such projections or forward-looking state-
ments include a list of statements in specified documents:
(1) A statement containing a projection of revenues, income (loss),
earnings (loss) per share, capital expenditures, dividends, capital
structure or other financial items;
(2) A statement of management's plans and objectives for future
operations;
(3) A statement of future economic performance contained in man-
agement's discussion and analysis of financial condition and results
of operations included pursuant to Item 303 of Regulation S-K...
or Item 9 of Form 20-F; or
5. See, e.g., Statement of the Commission Regarding Disclosure Obligations of
Municipal Securities Issuers and Others Exchange Act Release No. 33,741, 59 Fed.
Reg. 12,748 (March 9, 1994) (interpreting antifraud provisions to assist municipal se-
curities issuers, brokers, dealers and municipal securities dealers); Municipal Securi-
ties Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 26,985, 43 SEC Dock. 1880 (June 28, 1989)
(outlining requirements and exemptions pertaining to underwriters who participate in
primary offerings of municipal securities of $1,000,000 or more); cf. SEC to Issue Con-
cept Release on Investment Company Risk Disclosure, 26 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 46, at 1603 (Dec. 2, 1994) (commenting on the SEC's intention to issue a concept
release to address whether investment companies should be required to provide a
quantitative risk measure as part of their disclosure of derivative activities); AICPA
Releases Guide on Derivatives Auditing, Accounting Literature, 26 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 49, at 1728 (Dec. 23, 1994) (stating that "no single standard governs ac-
counting for derivatives").
6. 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b) (1994).
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(4) Disclosed statements of the assumptions underlying or relating
to any of the statements described in paragraphs (c) (1), (2), or (3)
of this section.7
Before 1972, the Commission generally prohibited the inclusion of
projections in filings under the 1933 and 1934 Acts.8 There were
three, somewhat overlapping, bases for this exclusionary policy. First,
the Commission assumed that the relevant constituency for its docu-
ments was the unsophisticated investor.9 According to the Commis-
sion's 1977 report by the Advisory Committee on Corporate
Disclosure (popularly known as the "Sommer Report"), the need to
protect unsophisticated investors outweighed the disclosure objective
of supplying the investment community with meaningful informa-
tion.' 0 Thus, the Commission justified the exclusion of projections as
necessary to prevent undue investor reliance or managerial manipula-
tion. Second, projections were sometimes characterized as not involv-
ing "facts" and as inherently unreliable." Third, paradoxically,
investors were characterized as being just as competent as managers
to make projections. 2 Harry Heller, a senior Commission attorney,
memorably articulated the last two points in a 1961 law review article:
As early as 1904 Veblen expressed the view that the value of an
investment basically is a function of future earning power....
The question will be raised, if the determination of future earn-
ings is the prime task confronting the investor, why not require or
permit a direct prediction of such earnings? The answer to this is
7. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175(c), 240.3b-6(c) (1994).
8. Several exceptions, generally for unfavorable information, developed over
time. By 1972, one commentator noted that the Commission "ha[d] required negative
disclosures, for example, on such topics as plant efficiency, management integrity, la-
bor relations, pending antitrust negotiations with the Justice Department, anticipated
changes in a company's competitive position, or trends reflected in recent interim
earnings, topics on which favorable disclosures would probably be prohibited." Carl
W. Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. Pa. L Rev. 254,
262 (1972) (footnotes omitted); see id. at 260-63.
The Commission also regularly employed earnings forecasts in approving 11(e)
plans under the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 79 (1988). See, e.g.,
Niagara Hudson Power Corp., 29 S.E.C. 773, 797-807 (1949) (determining the future
earnings forecasts of Niagara Hudson Power Corp. to assess whether to approve the
company's plans pursuant to section 11(e) of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act).
9. House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, Report of the Advisory
Comm. on Corp. Disclosure to the SEC, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 348 (Comm. Print 1977)
[hereinafter Sommer Report].
10. Id. See generally idL at 347-65 (outlining the reasons for requiring disclosure in
general and the use of management projections in particular). Concern that "projec-
tions ... would be accorded a greater measure of validity by the unsophisticated than
they would deserve" persuaded the Wheat Disclosure Policy Study "that the Commis-
sion's policy on projections should not be changed." SEC, Disclosure to Investors: A
Reappraisal of Federal Administrative Policies under the '33 and '34 Acts 96 (1969).
11. Harry Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16
Bus. Law. 300, 307 (1961).
12. Id.
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that the Securities Act, like the hero of "Dragnet", is interested ex-
clusively in facts. Conjectures and speculations as to the future are
left by the Act to the investor on the theory that he is as competent
as anyone to predict the future from the given facts. Since an expert
can speak with authority only as to subjects upon which he has pro-
fessional knowledge and since no engineering course or other pro-
fessional training has ever been known to qualify anyone as a
clairvoyant, attempts by companies to predict future earnings on
their own or on the authority of experts have almost invariably been
held by the Commission to be misleading because they suggest to
the investor a competence and authority which in fact does not
exist.1
3
On these bases, the Commission, in essence, took the view that pro-
jections were per se misleading and so stated in a note to one of its
proxy rules.' 4
By the early 1970s, the Commission's exclusionary policy was being
severely criticized. One influential critic was Professor Homer
Kripke. In a 1970 law review article, Kripke dismissed the Commis-
sion's policy as "nonsense."'1 5 While noting that most large corpora-
tions base important business decisions on projections, Kripke urged
that the public is less able than large companies to understand "the
meaning, results and implications" of projections.' 6
With the widespread belief that an "efficient market" in informa-
tion dissemination operated, however, concern that unsophisticated
investors would attach undue credence to projections was difficult to
sustain. Unsophisticated investors received much of their firm-spe-
cific data "second-hand," that is, filtered through brokers aided by
firm research departments and investment advisers. Alternatively,
these investors used market professionals, such as institutional inves-
tors, to invest for them. In either case, the weight an unsophisticated
investor was likely to attach to a forecast would be determined by a
professional investor. Moreover, deliberate management manipula-
tion of forecasts could be policed by securities fraud liability rules.
Thus, a more realistic fear, argued Kripke, was that by prohibiting
disclosure of earnings projections, the Commission had perpetuated a
form of differential disclosure.' 7 "Under its present system," Kripke
wrote, "the SEC precludes the giving of this information equally to all
investors through the documents filed with it."'1 8 While the average
13. Id. at 304, 307 (citation omitted).
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 note (1976) (proscribing predictions of specific future
market values, earnings, or dividends). The note later was withdrawn. Notice of With-
drawal of Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 12,371, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 80,461, at 86,201 (Apr. 23, 1976).
15. Homer Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1151, 1198 (1970).
16. Id. at 1198.
17. Id. at 1199.
18. Id.
1956 [Vol. 63
SOFT INFORMATION REVOLUTION
investor was precluded from receiving management projections, pro-
fessional investors informally obtained them through such media as
press conferences and speeches.' 9
Nor did Kripke believe that the danger of management exaggera-
tion of future earnings prospects posed a major problem. If there was
a rational basis for a forecast and if managerial "good faith" was re-
quired, "[t]he SEC staff would have no difficulty dealing with unrea-
soned or unduly optimistic projections of promotional companies, any
more than it did in the early 1930s or even today with unsound esti-
mates of mineral resources. '20 Kripke concluded:
The importance of this point on projections cannot be overesti-
mated. If there is any hope that the public or even the professionals
can make an informed investment judgment, it must start from a
crystallization of all of the plethora of information into a projection
for the future. The management is in the best position to make the
initial estimate; on the basis of it the professional or investor could
then make his own modifications. No other single change could add
as much meaning to the unmanageable and unfocussed flood of
facts in present Commission documents.2'
Soon after beginning his chairmanship, William Casey persuaded
the Commission to hold a public rulemaking proceeding to review the
policy barring publication of projections 2 In particular, Chairman
Casey appeared to be impressed by the British practice of including
earning forecasts in prospectuses and certain other public docu-
ments.23 The Commission held hearings in November and December
1972. In February 1973, the Commission published a "Statement on
the Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance," indi-
cating that the agency planned to move toward integrating projections
into the disclosure system, although it would not require issuers either
to develop or to disclose projections.z
In April 1975, the Commission published a detailed series of pro-
posals to implement its February 1973 statement on projections325
These proposals defined a projection as "a statement made by an is-
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Public Hearings on Estimates, Forecasts or Projections of Economic Perform-
ance, Exchange Act Release No. 9844, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCH) 79,075, at 82,322 (Nov. 1, 1972).
23. See id.
24. Statement by the Commission on the Disclosure of Projections of Future Eco-
nomic Peformance, Exchange Act Release No. 9984, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,211, at 82,665 (Feb. 2, 1973).
25. Notice of Proposed [Rules and Amendments] to Implement the "Statement by
the Commission on the Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance"
and to Provide for a more Timely Filing of the Change of Control Item of Form 8-K,
Exchange Act Release No. 11,374, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCH) 80,167, at 85,299 (Apr. 28, 1975).
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suer regarding material future revenues, sales, net income or earnings
per share of the issuer, expressed as a specific amount, range of
amounts... or percentage variation from a specific amount .... or a
confirmation by an issuer of any such statement made by another
person. "26
The proposed safe harbor rule provided that a projection would be
deemed not to be fraudulent, whether or not the projection was
achieved, if certain criteria were met at the time the projection, in
substance, was made. Specifically, the proposal required the issuer to
have registered securities, to have been subject to reporting require-
ments for at least three years, and to have complied with those re-
quirements in the past twelve months.27 The proposed rule further
required that the issuer had prepared internal budgets for the preced-
ing three fiscal years.2 Moreover, the projection must meet specific
criteria. Most notably, it must have been (1) made in good faith; (2)
"prepared with reasonable care by qualified personnel and carefully
reviewed and approved by mana ement at the appropriate levels";
and (3) identified as a projection.29 The proposal also mandated that
the registrant publicly disclose all projections furnished to anyone
other than a government agency.30 Finally, the proposal required the
registrant to revise any projection previously fied once it no longer
had a reasonable basis or briefly explain why it could not do so.3
The Commission's April 1975 report drew an unusually large
number of comment letters, virtually all of which opposed the propos-
als. As summarized in an appendix to the Sommer Report, there were
four primary grounds for opposition. First, opponents argued that the
complexity of the proposed disclosure system would discourage volun-
tary compliance. 2 Specifically, these critics pointed to the substantial
costs that registrants would incur.33 Second, critics contended that the
term "projection" needed further definition. The definition was so
vague, they argued, "that registrants [often] would not know if a re-
portable event had occurred."'  Third, opponents believed that few
registrants would bear the risks of the proposed safe harbor. Specifi-
cally, "[t]he subjective standards of 'reasonable care,' 'qualified per-
sonnel,' 'carefully reviewd [sic] and approved,' 'appropriate levels,'
'reasonable factual basis,' and 'good faith judgment' invited litiga-
26. IL at 85,302.
27. Notice of Proposed Rules and Amendments, Exchange Act Release No.
11,374, 6 SEC Dock. 746, 751 (Apr. 28, 1975).
28. Id
29. Id at 755.
30. Id at 756.
31. Id
32. Sommer Report, supra note 9, app. at 291.
33. Id app. at 291-92.
34. Id app. at 292.
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tion."35 Finally, registrants threatened to limit the flow of information
to the investment community if the proposals were adopted.3
The concern about "inviting litigation" was expressed with particu-
lar fervor in light of a number of cases decided in the years immedi-
ately preceding the Commission's April 1975 proposals. In one case,
brought under section eleven of the Securities Act of 1933, the court
held that a registration statement filed in connection with a takeover
bid should have disclosed the target insurance company's "surplus sur-
plus"-that is, the surplus in excess of the amount required by the
state insurance authorities.37 The court rejected the argument that the
estimates were too unreliable, reasoning that the surplus surplus was
one of the principal reasons for the takeover attempt.3s In another
case, the court rejected a complaint against a chemical company be-
cause the shortfall resulted from a recession that had hit synthetic fi-
ber producers with particular impact.39 Furthermore, the company
had carefully developed internal forecast figures that were consistent
with the published figures, and the published forecast had fit into a
continuing framework of regular dissemination of company news,
good or bad.4° A third case supported the worst expectations of those
who opposed forecasts as legally dangerous.4 In that case, the court
held that a projection of income was false if it was not "highly prob-
able" that the predicted breakeven income level would be realized.4
The court also found, however, that there was no recklessness as re-
quired by rule 10b-5 as long as there was some basis for the
prediction.43
In April 1976, the Commission withdrew its proposed rules on pro-
jections "[d]ue to the important legal, disclosure policy and technical
issues raised by the commentators."'  Instead, the agency proposed
substantively identical Guides 62 (under the Securities Act) and 4
(under the Exchange Act) outlining the views of the Division of Cor-
35. 1I
36. Id. app. at 293. A 1972 study reported that more than 97% of the responding
companies prepared sales, expense and earnings forecasts, but that all companies ex-
pressed concern over the consequences of releasing their internal figures. Financial
Executive Research Foundation, Public Disclosure of Business Forecasts (1972).
37. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 580-81
(E.D.N.Y. 1971).
38. 1I at 579.
39. Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664, 689 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd per curiam,
464 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1972).
40. Id. at 686.
41. Beecher v. Able, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L_ Rep. (CC-I)
95,303, at 98,535-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
42. Id. at 98,536.
43. Id.
44. Notice of Adoption of an Amendment to Rule 14a-9, Exchange Act Release
No. 12,371, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCHI) 80,461, at 86,201
(Apr. 23, 1976).
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poration Finance on projections.45 The full Commission continued to
adhere to the position that it would neither encourage nor discourage
forecasts.46 The Commission added, nevertheless, that it would not
object to good faith projections that had a reasonable basis and an
appropriate format and were accompanied by information adequate
to enable investors to make their own judgments.47 The Commission
also articulated its belief that appropriate projections should not cre-
ate civil liability simply because they turn out to be erroneous. 48
Subsequently, the Sommer Advisory Committee on Corporate Dis-
closure urged that "the Commission should issue a public statement
encouraging companies to disclose voluntarily management projec-
tions in their filings with the Commission and elsewhere. In order to
maximize the attractiveness of the program to registrants, the Com-
mittee's recommendation permits wide latitude to companies issuing
projections. '49 Among other points, the Sommer Report recom-
mended that (1) all public companies50 be eligible to make projec-
tions;51 (2) disclosure of underlying assumptions be encouraged, not
required;52 (3) managers not be required to explain ex post facto the
variance of actual results from projections;53 (4) there be no require-
ments as to the specific items to be projected;54 and (5) the Commis-
sion adopt a safe harbor rule for "management projection of future
company economic performance . . . unless such information: (1)
[w]as prepared without a reasonable basis; or (2) [w]as disclosed other
than in good faith." 55
The Sommer Report recognized that the fundamental issue with re-
spect to projections was whether they should be permissive or
mandatory.56 It offered four reasons why a voluntary projection sys-
tem was preferable. First, a period of experimentation with a volun-
tary system was desirable before a mandatory rule was adopted.57
Second, for certain companies, the fiscal and administrative burdens
of projection disclosure might outweigh the benefits.58 Third, corpo-
rations were concerned that they would be liable for inaccurate pro-
45. Id
46. Id
47. Id at 86,200-01.
48. Id at 86,202.
49. Sommer Report, supra note 9, at 353 (footnote omitted). See generally id. at
ch. X (detailing recommendations that would transform the Commission into a more
forward-looking body).
50. The Report specifically declined to limit its recommendation to those compa-
nies with a record of filing in the 1934 Act continuous disclosure system. Id. at 356-57.
51. Id at 357.
52. Id at 358.
53. Id at 358-61.
54. Id at 362.
55. Id at 364.
56. Id at 354-55, app. at 318.
57. Id at 354.
58. Id
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jections.59 Finally, the Report observed, "a lack of operating history,
general economic factors or industry conditions" might effectively
prevent many companies from preparing reasonable projections.60
The Commission was generally persuaded by the analysis of the
Sommer Report. In late 1978, it authorized publication of the Divi-
sion of Corporation Finance's Guides on "Disclosure of Projections of
Future Economic Performance," 61 and prepared alternative versions
of a safe harbor rule.6' In mid-1979, to encourage projections, the
Commission adopted safe harbor rules under the 1933 and 1934 Acts,
to the effect that a forward-looking statement is not fraudulent unless
the plaintiff proves a lack of reasonable basis or lack of good faith.63
Although the rules as proposed for comment would have put the bur-
den of proof with respect to reasonableness and good faith on the
defendant, the Commission deferred to the recommendation of the
Sommer Report and imposed the burden on the plaintiff.6
As part of its integrated disclosure release in 1982, the Commission
rescinded the Division of Corporation Finance's "Guides for Disclo-
sure of Projections of Future Economic Performance" and relocated
their substance in Item 10(b) of Regulation S-K.65 Like the Guides,
Item 10(b) is hortatory. It encourages management to make projec-
tions, requires management to have a reasonable basis for its assess-
ment of a registrant's future performance and grants management
broad discretion as to how a reasonable basis for such an assessment is
to be assembled.66 If an outside review of management's projections
is included in a Commission filing (again, a matter of management
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Ex-
change Act Release No. 15,305, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH)
81,756, at 81,034 (Nov. 7, 1978).
62. Proposed Safe-Harbor Rule for Projections, Exchange Act Release No.
15,306, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,757, at 81,042 (Nov. 7.
1978).
63. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (1994). Both of these rules
were adopted in Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Exchange Act Release No. 15,944,
[1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,117, at 81,939 (June 25, 1979).
64. [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,117, at 81,940.
65. Rescission of Guides and Redesignation of Industry Guides, Exchange Act
Release No. 18,525, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3760 (Mar. 3, 1982) (rescission of
guides); Adoption of Integrated Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 18.524, 24
SEC Dock. 1262, 1298-99 (Mar. 3, 1982) (amendment of safe harbor rules); Proposed
Rulemaking to Implement the Integrated Disclosure System, Exchange Act Release
No. 18,014, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '1 83,016, at 84,479-
80 (Aug. 6, 1981) (proposal); Proposed Revision of Regulation S-K and Proposed
Rescission of Guides for the Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements and
Reports, Exchange Act Release No. 18,008, 23 SEC Dock. 311, 313, 316 (Aug. 6,
1981) (proposal); Proposed Revision of Regulation S-K and Guides for the Prepara-
tion and Filing of Registration Statements and Reports, Exchange Act Release No.
17,399, 21 SEC Dock. 1052, 1097, 1107-08 (Dec. 23, 1980) (proposal).
66. 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b) (1994).
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discretion), the reviewer's qualifications, the extent of its review, and
its relationship to the registrant must be disclosed.67 If the review is
included in a registration statement under the 1933 Act, the reviewer
is deemed an expert and an appropriate consent must be flied with the
registration statement.68
The Commission does not limit the items about which a projection
may be made, but it does caution management to avoid misleading
investors through selective projection of only favorable items.69 Man-
agement may choose the period for a projection and whether the pro-
jection is the most probable specific amount or a reasonable range.70
Managers are encouraged, but not required, to indicate their inten-
tions to update projections,71 to disclose their assumptions,72 and to
present the projections in a format that will facilitate subsequent anal-
ysis of the reasons for differences between actual and forecast re-
suIts. 73 Managers further are discouraged from discontinuing or
resuming projections without a reasonable basis. 74
B. Mandatory Forward-Looking Statements
When the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure endorsed
a voluntary approach to the disclosure of forward-looking statements,
its chairman, A. A. Sommer, was among those not entirely convinced
by the Committee's arguments. Elsewhere Sommer wrote:
Lurking in the Advisory Committee's conclusion that issuers should
be encouraged to publish soft information is a strange and troubling
anomaly. The Committee's recommendation appears to be pre-
mised on the conclusion that such information is important to inves-
tors, important enough that issuers should be pressed to disclose it.
Yet the Committee recoiled from making such disclosure
mandatory. With respect to information demonstrably less impor-
tant to decision making than forecasts, for example, compensation
to top officers, the Commission had not refrained from laying down
a flat requirement of disclosure. The Committee equivocated, and
the Commission continues to equivocate, with respect to "soft" in-
formation. Eventually the Commission will have to face up to this
inconsistency and the consequences of recognizing the materiality of
such information.75
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Sommer Report, supra note 9, at 362.
70. Id. at 361-62.
71. Id. at 359-60.
72. Id. at 358.
73. Id. at 365-74.
74. Id. at 362.
75. A.A. Sommer, Jr., Survey: Report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate
Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 26 UCLA L. Rev. 48, 54-55
(1978).
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At no time since the adoption of the SEC's safe harbor rules has
there been a high level of voluntary publication of forward-looking
information.7 6 The Commission, in essence, has responded to the
"troubling anomaly" implicit in the low levels of compliance with its
hortatory Item 10(b) by adopting several mandatory forward-looking
statement requirements, including those discussed in the balance of
this part.
1. Environmental Compliance Costs
Item 101(c)(xii) of Regulation S-K requires each registrant to dis-
close the material effects that compliance with federal, state and local
provisions relating to the protection of the environment may have
upon the capital expenditures, earnings and competitive position of
the registrant and its subsidiaries.' Specifically, the Item provides:
"The registrant shall disclose any material estimated capital expendi-
tures for environmental control facilities for the remainder of its cur-
rent fiscal year and its succeeding fiscal year and for such further
periods as the registrant may deem materials [sic]."718
The Commission initially adopted this standard in 1973 to comply
with the National Environmental Policy Act.79 Subsequently, the Nat-
ural Resources Defense Council challenged this standard, in part be-
cause the Commission had denied the its petitions for other
requirements concerning corporate environmental and equal employ-
ment practices.8 0 After protracted litigation, the Commission's denial
of the NRDC's proposals ultimately was approved.8 ' The court rea-
soned that Congress granted the Commission broad discretionary
powers, and that the Commission had no obligation to adopt the pro-
posals of the NRDC.
In Levine v. NL Industries, Inc.,83 the Second Circuit interpreted
Item 101(c)(1)(xii) to require disclosure of both the cost of compli-
ance with environmental regulations and potential costs for failure to
76. See, e.g., The Conference Board, Public Disclosure of Corporate Earnings
Forecasts 7 (Rep. 804 1981) (reporting that although only 42 of 405 corporate partici-
pants in a study have ever revealed their forecasts to outsiders, a majority neverthe-
less provided assistance to financial analysts in preparing the analysts' projections);
Douglas J. Skinner, Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News, 32 J. Acct. Res. 38, 38
(1994) ("[C]onsistent with prior studies, earnings-related voluntary disclosures occur
infrequently (on average, one disclosure for every ten quarterly earnings
announcements).").
77. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(xii) (1994).
78. Id.
79. Notice of Adoption of Amendments to Registration and Report Forms, Ex-
change Act Release No. 10,116, [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 'I
79,342, at 83,029 (Apr. 20, 1973).
80. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC. 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir.
1979) [hereinafter NRDC].
81. Id. at 1062; see Sommer Report, supra note 9, at 393.
82. NRDC, 606 F.2d at 1045.
83. 926 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1991).
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comply.8 4 In so doing, the court followed the SEC's stated intention
that disclosure of such costs be required. 5
2. Legal Proceedings
Item 103 requires a brief description of any material pending legal
proceeding, other than ordinary routine litigation.86 The instructions
to Item 103 provide some guidance concerning ordinary negligence
claims;87 damages claims;88 bankruptcy, receivership, or similar pro-
ceedings;89 derivative litigation;" and environmental proceedings.91
Nonetheless, the very breadth of this Item has given rise to inter-
pretative questions. In 1988, the Commission published an interpreta-
tive release reminding companies of their disclosure obligations in
connection with issues arising from the government's defense contract
procurement inquiry.92 With respect to disclosure of material pending
legal proceedings involving a company or its subsidiaries, the Com-
mission observed:
Legal proceedings known to be contemplated by government agen-
cies similarly should be disclosed where management reasonably
believes that such government action will have a material effect
upon the company and its business. In this regard, disclosure of
known contemplated government proceedings may be required
where the result may be the cancellation of a government contract,
suspension of payments under a contract, termination of further
business with the government, or alterations of the registrant's pro-
cedures for obtaining government contracts.93
The Commission further observed that disclosure obligations could
arise under several other Regulation S-K Items, such as Item 101 (De-
scription of Business) or Item 303 (Management's Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations).94
Instruction 5C to Item 103 requires disclosure of environmental
proceedings when a government authority is a party and the proceed-
ing involves potential monetary sanctions, unless the registrant rea-
sonably believes that the monetary sanctions, exclusive of interest and
84. Id at 203-04.
85. Id (citing In re United States Steel Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 16,223
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,319, at 82,384 (Sept. 27,
1979)).
86. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1994).
87. IdL instruction 1.
88. Id. instruction 2.
89. Id instruction 3.
90. Id instruction 4.
91. Id instruction 5.
92. Disclosure Obligations of Companies Affected by the Government, Exchange
Act Release No. 6791, [1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,432 (Aug.
1, 1988).
93. Id. at 62,126.
94. Id.
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costs, will be less than $100,000.95 In In re United States Steel Corp.,96
the Commission found that a corporation failed to disclose the mate-
rial effects that compliance with environmental laws would have on
capital expenditures and earnings and failed to disclose a series of
pending or contemplated environmental administrative proceedings
when it stated in its filings, "'U.S. Steel had pledged to confront and
resolve its environmental problems as effectively and efficiently as
technology, time and money permit.' "91 The Commission noted that
U.S. Steel detailed neither its policy nor the risks of noncompliance.93
More broadly, Item 103 does not define materiality.99 The Commis-
sion has long distinguished "quantitative" from "qualitative" material-
ity. The concept of quantitative materiality typically involves a
percentage of a corporation's assets, earnings, sales, or other numeri-
cal benchmarks. 10 While the percentage may vary with the context of
a rule or proceeding, and judgments often must be made about the
potential economic effects of a transaction or occurrence when the
immediate percentage is beneath the relevant threshold, the concept
of quantitative materiality is reasonably straightforward.
The Commission, however, long has recognized that in some cir-
cumstances involving matters such as managerial conflicts of interest
or violations of law, there should be disclosure even when the relevant
transaction or occurrence would not be quantitatively material. These
instances of "qualitative" materiality typically involve questions con-
cerning the integrity or ability of management. The extent to which
events involving qualitative materiality should be disclosed is a prob-
lem that long has defied neat solution.1' 1
95. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 instruction 5(c) (1994).
96. Exchange Act Release No. 16,223, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 82,319, at 82,381 (Sept. 27, 1979).
97. Id at 82,381 (quoting U.S. Steel Co.'s filings).
98. Id at 82,384.
99. The Sommer Report concluded, "Both as articulated by the courts and as set
forth in Commission rules, the definition [of materiality] is not readily translatable
into objective criteria." Sommer Report, supra note 9, at 321 (footnote omitted).
100. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 instruction 2 (1994) (stating that the amount in-
volved in proceedings shall be included in computing such percentage).
101. Cf. Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 776-79 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that the
issue of materiality is not resolved), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982); Stedman v.
Storer, 308 F. Supp. 881, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (discussing criteria for determining ma-
teriality); Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163, 169, 176 (1964) (noting that defining disclo-
sure objectives is a difficult task); John M. Fedders, Law Enforcement Against Those
Who Fail to Disclose Illegal Behavior, Remarks to Meeting of the Fed. Reg. of See.
Comm. of the ABA Sec. of Corp., Banking & Bus. L, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,279, at 85,520 (Nov. 19, 1982) (addressing five propositions
concerning quantitative materiality). See generally 2 Loss & Seligman, supra note 1, at
655-62 (citing cases decided without regard to materiality).
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3. Contingent Liabilities
Since December 1973, when the Commission issued Accounting Se-
ries Release No. 150,'" which normally requires financial statements
to be prepared in accordance with the "principles, standards, and
practice promulgated by the FASB [Financial Accounting Standards
Board]," the SEC has required compliance with the FASB statements
regarding contingent liabilities. °3 For some time, this policy has
meant compliance with FASB Statement No. 5. Under this State-
ment, a "loss contingency" involves an existing condition, situation, or
set of circumstances involving uncertainty as to possible loss that will
ultimately be resolved when one or more future events occur or fail to
occur. 0 4 When a loss contingency exists, the likelihood that the fu-
ture event(s) will confirm the loss can range from probable (meaning
"likely to occur") to reasonably possible ("more than remote but less
than likely") to remote ("the chance of the future event or events oc-
curring is slight").0 5 An estimated loss from a loss contingency must
be recognized in a financial statement if both of the following condi-
tions are met:
(a) Information available prior to issuance of the financial state-
ments indicates that it is probable that an asset had been impaired
or a liability had been incurred at the date of the financial state-
ments. It is implicit in this condition that it must be probable that
one or more future events)will occur confirming the fact of the loss.(b) The amount of loss can be reasonably estimated. 0 6
Alternatively, if one or both of these conditions are not met or if an
exposure to loss exists in excess of the amount accrued, the registrant
shall disclose the contingency when "there is at least a reasonable pos-
sibility that a loss or an additional loss may have been incurred."' 10 7
The disclosure must describe the nature of the contingency and, if pos-
sible, estimate the potential loss.' 0 8 The statement does not require
such disclosure where the assertion of a claim is unlikely.' 9
The most troublesome problem underWFASB Statement No. 5 in-
volves unasserted legal claims. With respect to unasserted claims and
assessments, the statement requires companies to determine the likeli-
102. Statement of Policy on the Establishment and Improvement of Accounting
Principles and Standards, Accounting Release No. 150, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (Accounting Series Releases) (CCH) j 72,172, at 62,339-13 (Dec.
20, 1973).
103. Id. at 62,340.
104. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 5, 2 (Mar. 1975).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 4 (footnote omitted).
107. Id. at 5.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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hood that suits will be filed.110 Should the filing of a lawsuit be
deemed "probable," the enterprise must determine the probability of
an unfavorable outcome.'1 ' If an unfavorable outcome is "reasonably
possible," disclosure is required."12
Given the overlap between Regulation S-K Items 101(c)(xii) and
103 and FASB Statement No. 5, the Commission and the judiciary
have addressed environmental contingencies under a variety of ap-
proaches. For example, in Staff Account Bulletin 92, the staff echoed
an FASB Emerging Issues Task Force in stating that "an environmen-
tal liability should be evaluated independently from any potential
claim for recovery."" 3 Reduction of any loss arising from recognition
of an environmental liability by a potential claim for recovery is ap-
propriate only when there is a likelihood that the claim will be real-
ized." 4 The Bulletin also recognized that an environmental liability
for a specific clean-up site may be discounted to reflect the changing
value of money over time. 15 This approach was proper only where
"the aggregate amount of the obligation and the amount and timing of
the cash payments [were] fixed or reliably determinable for that
site. 11 6 Finally, the Bulletin suggested that the time value of money
also be considered for any asset relating to a claim for recovery of a
liability that is recognized on a discounted basis.' 7
The staff published this Accounting Bulletin to provide guidance to
public companies regarding such issues as the methods of presenting
contingent liabilities in the balance sheet.", Among other comments,
the staff took the position that it is not ordinarily appropriate to re-
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 92, 58 Fed. Reg. 32,843, 32,843 (June 14, 1993)
(discussing FASB Statement No. 5, the Emerging Issues Task Force and Staff Account
Bulletin No. 92)
114. Id.
115. Id. at 32,844.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 32,844; cf. Richard Y. Roberts & Kurt R. Hohl, Environmental Liability
Disclosure and Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 92, 50 Bus. Law. 1 (1994) (concluding
that "environmental due diligence" will increase as environmental concerns become
more important to the public).
118. The Commission also has frequently analyzed loan loss reserves as contingent
liabilities subject to FASB Statement No. 5. See In re First Chicago Corp., Exchange
Act Release No. 24,567, [1987-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (Accounting &
Auditing Enforcement Releases) (CCH) 73,603, at 63,024 (June 10, 1987) (applying
FASB Statement No. 5 to possible loan losses); In re Coopers & Lybrand, Exchange
Act Release No. 21,520, [1982-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (Accounting &
Auditing Enforcement Releases) (CCH) 1 73,445, at 63,167-68 (Nov. 27, 1984)
(same); In re Utica Bankshares Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 20,702, [1982-1987
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (Accounting & Auditing Enforcement Releases)
(CCH) 73,424, at 63,099 (Feb. 29, 1984) (same).
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flect in a single net amount a probable contingent liability and an off-
setting claim for recovery.119
Similairly, in Endo v. Albertine,2 ° the court declined to dismiss a
plaintiff's complaint alleging that a prospectus inadequately disclosed
a contingent "superfund" environmental liability.' 2 ' The court ques-
tioned a magistrate's finding that the combination of the use of the
word "Superfund" and a major newspaper article on the topic sufficed
to inform a reasonable investor as to the magnitude of the defendant's
environmental liabilities. 22
4. Management Discussion and Analysis
In many respects, the most significant mandatory forward-looking
statement requirements appear in Item 303 of Regulation S-K. 23 This
Item is of particular significance for "troubled companies" and is a
key part of the evolution of the Commission's approach to accounting
from an emphasis on "hard facts" to its emphasis on "soft" or for-
ward-looking information. It is a comprehensive disclosure item. In
effect, the Commission staff has employed the concepts of liquidity
and capital resources to require managers to comment on material
changes that may occur in a registrant's balance sheet. 24 The Com-
mission has used the concept of results of operations to require similar
disclosures concerning a registrant's income statement.' 2-
Management discussion of corporate earnings was initially required
in 1974, with the Commission obligating registrants to discuss an item
of revenue or expense when it changed by more than ten percent in
successive periods and changed average net income by more than two
percent for the most recent three years presented.12 6 In 1980, after
the Sommer Report criticized the numerical materiality test in this
119. Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 92, 58 Fed. Reg. 32,843, 32,844 (June 14, 1993).
120. 812 F. Supp. 1479 (N.D. 111. 1993).
121. Id at 1487.
122. Id.
123. 17 C.F.R. 238.303 (1994); cf. Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements,
Exchange Act Release No. 34,831, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,346, at 85,783 (Oct.,
13, 1994) (expressly encouraging, but not requiring, registrants to supply forward-
looking information).
124. Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Exchange Act Release No.
34,831, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,436, at 85,783 n.39 (Oct. 13, 1994)
125. Id.
126. See Proposed Amendment to the Guides for Preparing and Filing Reports and
Registration Statements, Exchange Act Release No. 9913, [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 79,144, at 82,478-79 (Dec. 18, 1972) (proposal);
Notice of Revision of Proposed Amendment to Guide 22 for Preparation and Filing
of Registration Statements, Exchange Act Release No. 10,549, [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 79,615, at 83,646 (Dec. 12, 1973) (revised propo-
sal); Notice of Adoption of Amendments to Guide for Preparation and Filing of Re-
gistration Statements, Exchange Act Release No. 10,961, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCM) 79,924, at 84,397 (Aug. 12, 1974) (adopting amendments to
Guide 22 under the 1933 Act and Guide 1 under the 1934 Act).
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standard and recommended broadening the analysis to include capital
budget plans,127 the Commission adopted its current approach to the
Management Discussion and Analysis Item.'1 s
Item 303(a) requires managements of all registrants to discuss and
analyze financial condition and results of operations for full fiscal
years. 29 Item 303(b) directs registrants required by Article 3 of Reg-
ulation S-X to provide a similar analysis in interim financial state-
ments. 30 Management's discussion and analysis (the "MD&A") must
focus on any facts and uncertainties that may prevent reported finan-
cial information from serving as an accurate basis for projecting future
operating results or financial condition.13 '
The Commission long has emphasized the need for disclosures con-
cerning liquidity and capital resources. Instruction 5 to Item 303(a)
defines liquidity as "the ability of an enterprise to generate adequate
amounts of cash to meet the enterprise's needs for cash." 131 The reg-
istrant is required to "[i]dentify any known trends or any known de-
mands, commitments, events or uncertainties that will result in... the
registrant's liquidity increasing or decreasing in any material way. "133
Similar disclosure must be made concerning commitments for capital
expenditures.34 The registrant must also indicate any expected mate-
rial changes in the mix and the relative cost of capital resources, as
well as consider changes among equity, debt and any off-balance sheet
financing arrangements. 35
A second area of concern involves unusual or infrequent events or
transactions or significant economic changes that materially affect rev-
enues or expenses. Examples of significant events that might affect a
registrant's income statement would be the closing of unprofitable
manufacturing facilities, changes in inventory, changes in consumer
demand or changes in interest rates.' 36
127. Sommer Report, supra note 9, at 365-79.
128. Amendments to Annual Report Form; Integration of Securities Acts Disclo-
sure Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 17,114,20 SEC Dock. 1059, 1071-72 (Sept. 2,
1980) (adoption); Proposed Amendments to Annual Report Form; Integration of Se-
curities Acts Disclosure Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 16,496, [1979-1980
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,422, at 82,762 (Jan. 15, 1980)
(proposal).
129. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (1994).
130. Id. § 229.303(b).
131. Id. § 229.303 instruction 3.
132. Id. § 229.303 instruction 5.
133. Id. § 229.303(a)(1).
134. Id. § 229.303(a)(2).
135. Id. § 229.303(a)(2)(ii).
136. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations, Exchange Act Release No. 18,120, 23 SEC Dock. 962, 965-67 (Sept. 28,
1981).
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In 1989, the Commission published a significant interpretative re-
lease concerning Item 303.137 There the Commission explained the
distinction between prospective information that is required to be dis-
cussed under Item 303 and voluntary forward-looking statements. It
stated that Item 303 requires the disclosure of prospective information
based on "currently known trends, events, and uncertainties that are
reasonably expected to have material effects," but merely encouraged
disclosure of "anticipating a future trend or event or anticipating a less
predictable impact of a known event, trend or uncertainty."' 38 Specif-
ically, the release encouraged registrants, in preparing their MD&A
disclosures, to focus on each of the specific categories of known
data. 139 As an example, the Commission cited Item 303(a)(2)(i)'s re-
quirement that the registrant describe its material "commitments" for
capital expenditures as of the end of the latest fiscal period. 4 ' The
release explained that the term "commitments" does not include only
those to which the registrant is legally bound.'4' The Item also man-
dates disclosure "if material planned capital expenditures result from
a known demand, as where the expenditures are necessary to a contin-
uation of the registrant's current growth trend."'142 Similarly, the reg-
istrant must disclose any decision not to incur such expenses if it is
reasonably likely that the resulting adverse impact on the registrant
will be material.' The release further explained:
Where a trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty is
known, management must make two assessments:
(1) Is the known trend, demand, commitment, event or uncer-
tainty likely to come to fruition? If management determines that it
is not reasonably likely to occur, no disclosure is required.
(2) If management cannot make that determination, it must eval-
uate objectively the consequences of the known trend, demand,
commitment, event or uncertainty, on the assumption that it will
come to fruition. Disclosure is then required unless management
determines that a material effect on the registrant's financial condi-
tion or results of operations is not reasonably likely to occur.1
4 4
While this discussion is somewhat less than crystalline in its clarity,
the Commission and the judiciary have considerably amplified the for-
ward-looking significance of Item 303 through litigation. Several SEC
137. Management's Discussion and Analysis, Exchange Act Release No. 26,831, 43
SEC Dock. 1330 (May 18, 1989).
138. Id. at 1333. The Commission listed the following examples of information that
would require disclosure: "A reduction in the registrant's product prices; erosion in
the registrant's market share; changes in insurance coverage; or the likely non-re-
newal of a material contract." Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Ld.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1333-35.
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proceedings are of note. In SEC v. Ronson Corp.,'45 a consent order
was entered into by a company that failed to describe in its MD&A
that its largest customer, which in earlier years had accounted for fif-
teen percent of consolidated revenues and approximately thirty-three
percent of earnings from continuing operations before income taxes,
had shut down, suspending all purchases. 146
Similarly, in Caterpillar, Inc,"' the Commission issued a cease and
desist order under section 21(c) for Caterpillar's failure to disclose in-
formation about its Brazilian subsidiary, CBSA, which was responsi-
ble in 1989 for twenty-three percent of Caterpillar's net profits,
although its revenues represented only five percent of the parent com-
pany's revenues. The Commission explained that Caterpillar "was not
required to prepare its consolidated financial statements showing
CBSA as either an industry segment or a foreign operation."14 8 Fur-
thermore, the Commission emphasized that the financial statements
and accompanying notes failed to indicate the importance of CBSA's
earnings to Caterpillar's overall results of operations.149 This informa-
tion was required both because (1) the CBSA earnings materially af-
fected Caterpillar's reported income from continuing operations, and
(2) there was a future uncertainty regarding CBSA's operations as
well as a possible risk of Caterpillar having materially lower earnings
as a result of that risk.'50
In SEC v. Shared Medical System Corp.,'5' the Commission settled
a section 21(c) proceeding with an issuer that disclosed a known unfa-
vorable trend in sales activity in a February 17, 1987, press release, but
failed to make the same disclosure in its IMD&A discussion in its 1986
Form 10-K annual report or its first quarter 1987 Form 10-Q. In In re
Salant Corp.,5 2 the Commission settled proceedings when it found
that a registrant could not reasonably have concluded that its declin-
ing financial condition and cash position would abate in the future.
The registrant was required to include in its MD&A discussion of ma-
terial uncertainties such matters as the fact that, in a prior year, losses
incurred had resulted in a fifty-seven percent reduction in credit
agreement net worth.153 The Commission concluded that "[b]y failing
to discuss its decreasing liquidity, how that decline resulted in uncer-
tainties about its future liquidity, and how [the registrant] Salant in-
145. [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,464, at 96,652
(D.NJ.) (Aug. 15, 1983).
146. Id
147. Exchange Act Release No. 30,532, 7 Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 73,829, at
63,050 (Mar. 31, 1992).
148. Id at 63,055.
149. Id
150. Id
151. Litigation Release No. 13,967, 56 SEC Dock. 199 (Feb. 17, 1994).
152. Exchange Act Release No. 34,046, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 74,021, at
63,389-78 (May 12, 1994).
153. Id
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tended to remedy the problem, Salant failed to comply with the
liquidity provision of Item 303." 111
As these SEC actions suggest, the Commission has brought enforce-
ment proceedings only in extreme or egregious cases under Item 303.
At the same time, the judiciary has clarified that a private litigant can-
not bring an implied cause of action based solely on a violation of
Item 303.'11
5. Tender Offer Rules
Item 4 of Schedule 13D and Item 5 of Schedule 14D-1 require bene-
ficial owners of five percent of specified equity securities and specified
tender offer bidders to describe plans or proposals which relate to or
would result in specified types of transactions. 56 Item 4 of Schedule
13D has been a frequent subject of litigation. The courts have refused
to grant defendants summary judgment when they made obfuscatory
or incomplete disclosures of their purposes and plans.157 Courts have
issued temporary restraining orders when, for example, a filing person
generally disclaimed any plans or proposals "to liquidate the Issuer,
sell its assets, merge it with any other person or persons, or make any
other major change in its business or corporate structure. 158  In these
cases, the filing person failed to disclose tentative plans to sell the real
estate assets of the target while not liquidating its retail assets. 159
The typical Item 4 case involves a person who states no present plan
to acquire control or merge with a target, but in fact had or subse-
quently formed that intention. It is a clear violation of Item 4 to make
no disclosure of an intent to seek control of or merge with the target
when it is proven that this was the acquiror's intent.160 To be actiona-
154. Id at 63,389-85.
155. In re Cypress Semiconductor Sec. Litig., [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 97,060, at 94,695-98 (N.D. Cal.) (Sept. 23, 1992); Alfus v. Pyramid Tech-
nology Corp., 764 F. Supp. 598, 608 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
156. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-101, 240.14d-100 (1994).
157. See, e.g., Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216, 1225-27 (4th Cir. 1980)(criticizing failure to explain what a "long-term relationship" meant), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1101 (1981); Graphic Sciences, Inc. v. International Mogul Mines Ltd., 397 F.
Supp. 112, 126 (D.D.C. 1974) (characterizing language as, "at best, circumlocutory").
158. Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (quoting
GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1971)).
159. Id
160. See, e.g., General Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90, 95-96 (1st Cir. 1977)(upholding district court finding that Schedule 13D was inaccurate for failure to state
that purchase of shares was for acquisition of control); Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great
Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 696-97 (2d Cir. 1973) (stating that plaintiff's failure
to disclose intention to take control would violate § 14e); Homac, Inc. v. DSA Fin.
Corp., 661 F. Supp. 776, 794 (E.D. Mich. 1987) ("[Defendant] must fully and com-
pletely state its purpose which, among other things, is to gain control over [plain-
tiff]."); Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 203, 214-17 (N.D. Tex.
1984) (requiring defendant to disclose intent to gain control of plaintiff in its Schedule
13D filings), aff'd on this ground, 741 F.2d 707, 712-13 (5th Cir. 1984).
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ble, there need not be evidence of a "fixed plan"-merely a purpose
(or, as Item 4 states, a proposal) to result in any of the designated
actions. 6 ' It is sufficient, for example, if a plan or proposal not yet
formally approved by the board has been adopted by senior corporate
officers, on the assumption that there is sufficient evidence to impute
the plan or proposal to the corporation."6 A purpose to acquire ulti-
mately a specific percentage of a target's stock would have to be dis-
closed under Item 4(a). 63 If a person intends to acquire an
unspecified number of additional shares, equivocal or "may acquire"
language with respect to additional shares is impermissible."6 It is
similarly a violation to fail to promptly amend Item 4 of Schedule 13D
when a potential acquiror has formed an intent to influence or control
a potential target's management.165
While this Item requires disclosure of current plans,' 66 there is no
requirement under Item 4 to make predictions of future plans, or to
disclose inchoate plans. 67 Nor need a person disclose plans that are
"indefinite, tentative, or still unformed.""
161. Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 240, 246-47 (8th Cir.
1979); K-N Energy, Inc. v. Gulf Interstate Co., 607 F. Supp. 756, 767-68 (D. Colo.
1983). There are also limits to stating too broad a position-such as "we are consider-
ing all options"-when plans are more precise. See K-N Energy, 607 F. Supp. at 768;
see also SEC v. Amster & Co., 762 F. Supp. 604, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that a
decision to seek control requires an Item 4 filing even if no decision has yet been
made concerning the means to achieve it).
162. See, e.g., Otis Elevator Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 405 F. Supp. 960, 971
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (stating that a plan will not be considered inchoate if there is strong
evidence of its adoption by high corporate officers over a period of time).
163. Saunders Leasing System, Inc. v. Societe Holding Gray D'Albion S.A., 507 F.
Supp. 627, 633-34 (N.D. Ala. 1981).
164. See Trane Co. v. O'Connor Sec., 561 F. Supp. 301, 307-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
165. In re Merry Land & Inv. Co., Exchange Act Release No. 26,410,42 SEC Dock.
796, 799-801 (Dec. 30, 1988).
166. See, e.g., Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 872 (2d
Cir. 1974) ("14D require[s] a tender offer to state or summarize the information re-
quired by Schedule 13D."), cerL denied, 419 U.S. 883; Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am.
Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075, 1085-86 (5th Cir. 1970) (requiring basic honesty and fair
dealing in disclosure); In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 697 F. Supp. 1344, 1354 (D.
DeL 1988) ("Statements in a Schedule 13-D are necessarily only reflections of present
intent of the party filing."); Koppers Co. v. American Express Co., 689 F. Supp. 1371,
1395 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (referring to Schedule 14D-1, which requires disclosure).
167. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Madison Fund, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1383, 1387
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("Schedule 13D was not intended for a recount of history, the evalu-
ation of the investment process, its negotiation and discussions."). Nor need there be
disclosure of "general business philosophy." Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Heil, 705 F.
Supp. 497, 503 (D. Idaho 1988); Pabst Brewing Co. v. Kalmanovitz, 551 F. Supp. 882,
894 (D. Del. 1982).
168. Purolator, Inc. v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 554, 556 (D.D.C. 1981); see also
Azurite Corp. v. Amster & Co., 844 F. Supp. 929, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting that
§ 13(d) "does not require a party filing a Schedule 13D statement to disclose prelimi-
nary considerations, exploratory work or tentative plans to wage a proxy battle and
that it only requires disclosure of definite plans"); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Great. N.
Nekoosa Corp., 795 F. Supp. 484, 487 (D. Me. 1990) (stating that mere consideration
of possibility of future sale of assets need not be disclosed).
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On the other hand, the language employed in an Item 4 disclosure is
entitled to reasonable inferences. A person who has acquired five
percent or more of a potential target and discloses past and ongoing
consideration of a tender offer for all or a portion of the unpurchased
shares, normally will be granted summary judgment unless the plain-
tiffs have proof of more definite plans than those disclosed.169 Only
the disclosure of relevant underlying facts, not of any subjective inter-
ests, is required. 7 °
6. Specific Industries
There also are forward-looking statement requirements for a
number of specific industries. For example, Item 102 of Regulation
S-K requires disclosure of reserves in the case of extractive indus-
tries. 17' This Item will typically require analysis of reserve esti-
mates. 172 Under FASB Statement No. 69, corporations with
significant oil and gas producing activities are required to disclose in
supplementary information "discounted future net cash flows relating
to proved oil and gas reserve quantities.' 73 Similarly, Securities Act
Industry Guide 4 requires disclosure of the proposed activities of oil
and gas programs.174 Securities Act Industry Guide 7 further requires
disclosure of both proved (measured) and probable (indicated)
reserves for issuers engaged in significant mining operations. 7
Bank holding companies are obligated to publish their allowances
for loan loss reserves. 76 Property casualty insurance underwriters are
169. See, e.g., S-G Sec., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1127-28 (D. Mass.
1978) (granting summary judgment where plaintiff has "not shown that defendants
had any more definite plans than those disclosed in the Schedule 13D"); see also Vor-
nado, Inc. v. Interstate Properties, 470 F. Supp. 714, 717-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding
that defendant did not have any intentions other than those stated in Schedule 13D);
Transcon Lines v. A. G. Becker Inc., 470 F. Supp. 356, 377-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (con-
cluding that plaintiff failed to show that Schedule 13D was misleading with respect to
defendants' plans).
170. Chock Full O'Nuts Corp. v. Finkelstein, 548 F. Supp. 212,218 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
cf. Energy Ventures, Inc. v. Appalachian Co., 587 F. Supp. 734, 742-43 (D. Del. 1984)
(holding that failure to disclose an alleged decision to acquire a majority of common
stock did not violate the Securities Exchange Act).
171. 17 C.F.R. § 229.102 (1994).
172. Id. instructions 3-6; 2 Loss & Seligman, supra note 1, at 647-49.
173. Securities Act Industry Guide 2, reprinted in 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
3826, at 3311 (July 28, 1993); Supplemental Disclosures of Oil and Gas Producing
Activities, Exchange Act Release No. 19,337, [1982] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
72,409, at 78,492 (Dec. 15, 1982); see also Hiex Dev. USA, Inc., Exchange Act Release
No. 26,722, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 73,690 (April 13, 1989)
(reiterating the disclosure standards required by FASB Statement No. 69).
174. Securities Act Industry Guide 4, reprinted in 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
3828, at 3332-33 (Dec. 10, 1986).
175. Securities Act Industry Guide 7, reprinted in 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
3831, at 3350 (Aug. 26, 1992).
176. Securities Act Industry Guide 3, reprinted in 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
3827, at 3329 (Mar. 16, 1983).
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similarly required to discuss their "significant reserving
assumptions."'"
Finally, when a partnership rollup transaction occurs, a general
partner is obligated, among other things, to compare the value of the
proposed transaction to the going concern value of the firm. 178 This
comparison normally will include an appraisal based in part on the
future earnings of a partnership.1 79
C. Conclusion
The Commission has gone far to buttress the voluntary forward-
looking statement Item 10(b) of Regulation S-K with a number of spe-
cific mandatory requirements. Several inferences can be derived
from the Commission's approach to forward-looking statements over
the past few decades. First, there has never been a high level of
compliance with Item 10(b). Claims that recent litigation has had a
"chilling effect" on the disclosure of forward-looking statements are
overstated. When the Commission believes the disclosure of forward-
looking information is necessary to investors, it has had no difficulty
mandating its disclosure. 180 When the Commission has not believed
that a mandatory disclosure requirement is warranted, issuers and reg-
istrants generally have not voluntarily disclosed forward-looking
information.181
Second, it is uncertain that a broader safe harbor would significantly
increase voluntary disclosure of forward-looking information. One
can argue that market forces could prompt voluntary disclosure of all
or most information that is material to investors.1a8 These market
forces have proven not to operate particularly well with respect to
specific types of forward-looking information such as earnings fore-
casts. 83 One can theorize that many firms' disclosure practices, if not
subject to mandatory rules, would be the product of both financial
considerations and concerns about the firms' competitive position.
Because of concerns about the competition's response to dissemina-
tion of material financial information, some firms presumably would
prefer to suffer lower stock market prices or pay higher costs of capi-
tal than to run the risk of inspiring additional or earlier entrants into
their product markets (or inspiring takeover bidders). The balance
between financial and competitive considerations varies by firm based
on such factors as the need for new capital, fear of new competition,
177. Securities Act Industry Guide 6, reprinted in 1 Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH)
3830, at 349-12 (Aug. 26, 1992).
178. 17 C.F.R. § 229.910 instruction 2 (1994).
179. 17 C.F.R. § 229.911 (1994).
180. See supra part I.B.
181. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
182. See 1 Loss & Seligman, supra note 1, at 188-92.
183. See text accompanying notes 58-60.
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and the relative influence of corporate financial and operating
executives.
Third, if the Commission seeks to issue a new safe harbor rule or
rules, it should do so on a broad canvas. The appropriate safe harbor
rule for an earnings forecast may be quite different from the appropri-
ate safe harbor rule for environmental capital expenditures, legal pro-
ceedings, contingent liabilities, known material events and
uncertainties bearing on future operating results or financial condi-
tion, a tender offer bidder's plans, an extractive industry firm's prob-
able reserves, a bank holding company's loan loss allowances, or the
going concern value of a partnership engaged in a rollup transaction.
Because the facts and circumstances underlying any one of these types
of forward-looking statements are variable, I will later urge that the
Commission would be wisest to address how litigation can be avoided
or reduced through a detailed interpretative release.'84 One point,
however, is clear. Any new rule or release should be broad enough to
address forward-looking statements under each of the relevant horta-
tory and mandatory requirements.
II. RISK FACrORS AND ASSUMPTIONS
When the Commission adopted its safe harbor rules for forward-
looking statements in 1979, it waffled on the significance of the disclo-
sure of risk factors and assumptions to accompany a forward-looking
statement. On one hand, the SEC emphasized the importance of the
disclosure of assumptions in aiding investors to understand and to
evaluate these statements. 85 On the other hand, the Commission, in
accordance with the Sommer Report's recommendation, declined to
mandate disclosure of assumptions in all circumstances.18 6 The Com-
mission generally requires the disclosure of risk factors in registration
statements and prospectuses, 8 7 but these requirements do not specifi-
cally address forward-looking statements.1s The thrust of the adop-
tion release was the determination that "[u]nder certain circumstances
the disclosure of underlying assumptions may be material to an under-
standing of the projected results."'189
184. See infra part II.B.
185. Safe Harbor Rules for Projections, Exchange Act Release No. 15,944, [1979
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,117, at 81,938 (June 25, 1979).
186. Id. at 81,942.
187. 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (1994). See generally 2 Loss & Seligman, supra note 1,
at 678-82 (discussing the various types of information that could be considered risk
factors). There are also specific industry risk factor requirements. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.904 (1994) (requiring disclosure of material risks and effects of roll-up
transactions).
188. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (1994).
189. [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,117 at 81,942. The re-
lease continued:
The Commission also believes that the key assumptions underlying a for-
ward looking statement are of such significance that their disclosure may be
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The Commission has not been clear as to how assumptions and risk
factors should be disclosed in the context of various types of forward-
looking statements, and has failed to indicate whether disclosure of
material assumptions and risks will reduce a firm's expense to liability.
This absence of clear guidance has created a lacuna that the judiciary
has struggled to address in recent years.
A. The Bespeaks Caution Doctrine
The bespeaks caution doctrine holds that cautionary language ac-
companying projections may protect against allegations of fraud.'90
Eight circuits have adopted variants of the bespeaks caution doctrine
to limit liability exposure for forward-looking statements.1 91 There is
considerable variation in how the courts have developed this
doctrine.192
In the First Circuit, the doctrine immunized from liability an alleged
omission-"that the standardbred horse industry was entering a re-
cessionary period, making past performance an imperfect indicator of
the future"' 93-in light of a detailed attached report describing "a
number of specific problems facing the standardbred industry, includ-
ing overbreeding, declining attendance at races and an average de-
cline in yearling prices.' 94 This application of the bespeaks caution
doctrine did not involve a challenge to an express forward-looking
statement, but merely a dismissal of an alleged omission.
In the Second Circuit case of I. Meyer Pincus & Associates v. Op-
penheimer & Co.," 5 plaintiffs alleged that a prospectus was materially
necessary in order for such statements to meet the reasonable basis and
good faith standards embodied in the rule. Because of the potential impor-
tance of assumptions to investor understanding and in order to encourage
their disclosure, the rule as adopted indicates specifically that disclosed as-
sumptions also are within its scope.
Id.
190. Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that "Bespeak Caution", 49 Bus. Law. 481,
481 (1994).
191. See Saltzberg v. TM Sterling/Austin Assocs., 45 F.3d 399 (11th Cir. 1995) (per
curiam); Miller v. Pezzani, (In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig.), 35 F.3d 1407, 1417
(9th Cir. 1994); Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 166-68 (5th Cir. 1994); Kaufman v.
Trump's Castle Funding (In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig.), 7 F.3d 357,371-73
(3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1219 (1994); Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638-
40 (6th Cir. 1993); Moorhead v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 949 F2d
243, 245-46 (8th Cir. 1991); I. Meyer Pincus & Assocs. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 936
F.2d 759, 763 (2d Cir. 1991); Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875, 879
(1st Cir. 1991).
192. Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Exchange Act Release No.
34,831, [1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85, 436, at 85,794 (Oct. 13,
1994); Royce de R. Barondes, The Bespeaks Caution Doctrine: Revisiting the.Applica-
tion of Federal Securities Law to Opinions and Estimates, 19 J. Corp. L 243, 252-68
(1994); Langevoort, supra note 190, at 487-88.
193. Romani, 929 F.2d at 879.
194. Id.
195. 936 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1991).
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misleading because of two sentences that could be read to suggest that
shares of closed-end investment companies were as likely to trade at a
premium as at a discount.'96 The Second Circuit dismissed the com-
plaint based upon a somewhat more detailed discussion elsewhere in
the prospectus, which stated that shares of closed-end investment
companies frequently trade at a discount from their net asset value.1 97
Neither the First Circuit nor the Second Circuit provided guidance as
to how detailed a discussion of a risk factor must be to immunize an
allegedly misleading material misrepresentation or omission.
A more detailed analysis appears in the Third Circuit's opinion in
Kaufman v. Trump's Castle Funding (In re Donald J. Trump Casino
Sec. Litig.).' 9s The Trump court stated that, when accompanied by
"meaningful cautionary statements," projections may be the basis of a
securities fraud claim only if the cautionary language does not affect
"the 'total mix' of information" provided.199 The court further as-
serted that the bespeaks caution doctrine applies equally to misrepre-
sentations and omissions.200 In either instance, "cautionary
statements included in the document may render the challenged pre-
dictive statements or opinions immaterial as a matter of law."' Such
statements must be substantive and specific; vague or boilerplate dis-
claimers will not suffice. 2
The Trump opinion contains two significant limitations on its articu-
lation of the doctrine. First, it is limited to prospective information. In
this view, the bespeaks caution doctrine cannot be used to insulate
from liability a defendant who misrepresents or omits a historical fact.
Second, this case appropriately cautions against invocation of the doc-
trine when the risk factors or disclosures are vague or boilerplate.20 3
There was little elaboration, however, as to when a disclosure would
be vague or boilerplate and, therefore, ineffective.
Trump failed to address a third limitation that arguably should ap-
ply. A cautionary statement found in a risk factor or disclaimer
should be given no weight if the defendants were aware (or should
have been aware) of a prospective negative material fact and chose
not to disclose it. The bespeaks caution doctrine, in other words,
should not be a device by which defendants can obscure or misrepre-
sent prospective bad news.
196. Id. at 762.
197. Id. at 761-63.
198. 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1219 (1994).
199. Id. at 371.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Cf. Pommer v. Medtest Corp., 961 F.2d 620, 624-25 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding
that generic warnings do not enlighten investors); Kline v. First W. Gov't Sec., Inc., 24
F.3d 480, 489 (3d Cir. 1994) (declining to apply the bespeaks caution doctrine where
plaintiffs failed to show specific reliance on disclaimer).
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The Fifth Circuit in Rubinstein v. Collins"° has taken a more skepti-
cal view of the bespeaks caution doctrine than the First, Second or
Third Circuits. The court stated:
Under our precedent, cautionary language is not necessarily suffi-
cient, in and of itself, to render predictive statements immaterial as
a matter of law... The appropriate inquiry is whether, under all
the circumstances, the omitted fact or the prediction without a rea-
sonable basis "is one [that] a reasonable investor would consider
significant in [making] the decision to invest, such that it alters the
total mix of information available about the proposed
investment."'2o5
The court emphasized that the existence of cautionary language
should not be dispositive, and it advocated a case-specific approach. 6
The Sixth Circuit has articulated a different type of skepticism.
Modifying an earlier bespeaks caution case, which had held that a
claim is insufficient as a matter of law if optimistic opinions are cou-
pled with cautionary statements,207 the Sixth Circuit in Mayer v. My-
lod 2°s relied on the Supreme Court decision in Virginia Bankshares,
Inc. v. Sandberg.2° The Court in Virginia Bankshares stated: "But
not every mixture with the true will neutralize the deceptive. If it
would take a financial analyst to spot the tension between the one and
the other, whatever is misleading will remain materially so, and liabil-
ity should follow. 210 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit concluded that
the true statements must be weighed against the untrue to determine
liability.211 The court therefore declined to resolve on a rule 12(b)(6)
motion a bank's statement that the value of loans in its portfolio is
"fairly reflected on the balance sheet. '212
In a relatively brief 1991 decision, the Eighth Circuit applied the
bespeaks caution doctrine to economic predictions concerning a resi-
dential retirement center.213 The court relied upon a feasibility study
attached to an offering memorandum that "contained a number of
risk statements, detailed cautionary language and disclosures about
the underlying economic assumptions, any of which could have af-
fected the retirement center's ability to pay back the bonds." 214 The
204. 20 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1994).
205. Id at 167-68 (alterations in original) (quoting Krim v. BancTexas Group, 989
F.2d 1435, 1445 (5th Cir. 1993)).
206. Id
207. Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037, 1040 (6th Cir. 1991).
208. 988 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1993).
209. 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
210. I at 1097.
211. 988 F.2d at 639.
212. Id. at 639-40.
213. Moorhead v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 949 F.2d 243 (8th
Cir. 1991).
214. Id at 245.
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case described neither the economic predictions nor any of the risk
statements, cautionary language, or underlying economic assumptions.
The Ninth Circuit generally has followed the Fifth Circuit analysis
in Rubenstein v. Collins.215 In Miller v. Pezzani (In re Worlds of Won-
der Sec. Litig.),216 the Ninth Circuit adopted the district court's warn-
ing that an unduly expansive application of the doctrine would
encourage deliberate misrepresentation by management.217 The court
therefore urged that the doctrine apply " 'only to precise cautionary
language which directly addresses itself to future projections, esti-
mates or forecasts in a prospectus.' "218 Blanket warnings of risk
should not suffice.2"9
Most recently, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the bespeaks caution
doctrine in Saltzberg v. TM Streling/Austin Assocs.. Y ° The brief per
curiam decision explicitly applied the doctrine as expressed in
Trump." The Saltzberg court stressed the importance of the context
in which the statement is made.'2
Other circuits have not adopted the bespeaks caution doctrine, but
have employed different analytical approaches. The Seventh and Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuits have focused on whether a forward-looking
statement had a reasonable basis when made. 3 Presumably a for-
ward-looking statement that ignored negative prospective material in-
formation would not have a reasonable basis.
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit has adopted an extreme approach,
holding that "projections of future performance not worded as guar-
antees are generally not actionable under the federal securities
laws." 4 Those statements upon which "[n]o reasonable investor
215. 20 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Miller v. Pezzani (In re Worlds of Wonder
Sec. Litig.), 35 F.3d 1407, 1413 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying the analysis of Rubinstein).
216. 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994).
217. Id at 1414.
218. Id. (quoting In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 814 F. Supp. 850, 858 (N.D.
Cal. 1993)).
219. Id
220. 45 F.3d 399 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
221. Id at 400.
222. Id
223. Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 513 (7th Cir. 1989).
224. 59 Fed. Reg. 52,723, 52,728 (1994) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (pro-
posed Oct. 1994) (citing Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 290 (4th Cir.
1993)). The concept release added:
In Malone v. Microdyne Corp., 26 F.3d 471, 479-80 (4th Cir. 1994), the
Court of Appeals relied on Raab in finding that a forward-looking statement
was not actionable because the "statement obviously did not constitute a
guarantee and was certainly not specific enough to perpetrate a fraud on the
market."
59 Fed. Reg. at 52,728. For a later articulation of the Fourth Circuit's views, see Hill-
son Partners Ltd. Partnership v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 1994).
1980 [Vol. 63
SOFT INFORMATION REVOLUTION
would rely" are immaterial, regardless of whether they are accompa-
nied by cautionary language.2
B. Proposed Interpretative Release
The Commission should publish a detailed interpretative release ar-
ticulating its views as to the appropriate disclosure of risk factors and
assumptions to accompany forward-looking statements. Leading judi-
cial decisions to date are neither consistent, detailed, nor particularly
useful in addressing forward-looking statements in contexts other than
the specific ones that were the immediate subjects of litigation. None-
theless, certain cases have dismissed complaints alleging material mis-
representations or omissions in forward-looking statements when
accompanied by disclosure of risks and assumptions. 26 These cases
suggest that appropriate disclosure of risks and assumptions is a par-
ticularly promising approach to the proper insulation of registrants
from legal liability with respect to the good faith disclosure of for-
ward-looking statements.
1. Contents of Release
An SEC interpretative release might begin with the Commission's
articulation of why forward-looking statements are not guarantees
and cannot retrospectively be judged solely on the basis of their inac-
curacy. The release could emphasize that the basic criterion of
whether a forward-looking statement should be actionable involves
whether sufficient information, including risks and assumptions, was
disclosed at the time of publication. The appropriate test is whether
such information amounts to a material misrepresentation or omission
under existing standards of materiality, misrepresentation, omission
and culpability established under such antifraud provisions as Securi-
ties Act § 11, Securities Exchange Act § 10(b) and rule 10b-5.
The major topic of the release should be a particularization of what
the Commission regards as appropriate disclosure of risks and as-
sumptions in each of the categories of required or encouraged for-
ward-looking statements under existing Commission rules and guides.
For example, the release might separately address appropriate risks
and assumptions disclosure for earnings forecasts, environmental
compliance costs, and extractive industry reserves, among other areas.
In each instance different modes of analysis may be appropriate. In-
deed, discussion of earnings forecasts (as well as other forward-look-
ing statements) may invite different Commission discussion depending
on the industry involved.
The release also would offer the Commission the opportunity to
state that an issuer or registrant can be held liable only for its own
225. Id at 211.
226. See supra notes 193-221 and accompanying text.
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forward-looking statements-not those of financial analysts or other
third parties-unless the issuer or registrant's level of entanglement
with the outsider satisfies a relevant culpability standard." 7
227. See, e.g., Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d
937, 949 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that item in Wall Street Journal column "Heard on
the Street" was not attributable to the issuer. "While a company may choose to cor-
rect a misstatement in the press not attributable to it,... we find nothing in the
securities legislation requiring it to do so."); see also Osofsky v. J. Ray McDermott &
Co., 725 F.2d 1057, 1059 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that defendant had no obligation to
correct statement on the Dow Jones broad tape); State Teachers Retirement Bd. v.
Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 850 (2d Cir. 1981) ("A company has no duty to correct or
verify rumors in the marketplace unless these rumors can be attributed to the
company.").
In Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980), the Second Circuit
observed:
We have no doubt that a company may so involve itself in the preparation of
reports and projections by outsiders as to assume a duty to correct material
errors in those projections. This may occur when officials of the company
have, by their activity, made an implied representation that the information
they have reviewed is true or at least in accordance with the company's
views.
Id. at 163. But a company assumed no duty to disclose its own internal earnings
forecasts or to warn analysts that their optimistic view was not shared by the company
if it merely reviewed analyst reports and made suggestions as to factual and descrip-
tive matters while adhering to a policy not to comment on earnings forecasts. Id. The
courts similarly have been unwilling to enforce a rule requiring companies to read
every article written about them and to correct inaccuracies in them. See, e.g.,
Hershfang v. Citicorp, 767 F. Supp. 1251, 1255-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that Cit-
icorp was not responsible for newspapers' inaccuracies or for executives' opinions on
future earnings); Schwartz v. Novo Industri, A/S, 658 F. Supp. 795, 799 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (holding that predictive statements made to newspaper did not give rise to lia-
bility); In re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Sec. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 227,
240 (W.D. Tex. 1979) (holding that executives do not have to correct others' misstate-
ments about acquisition target); Milberg v. Western Pac. R.R., 51 F.R.D. 280, 282(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (dismissing motion to certify class based on inaccurate predictions of
a financial publication), dismissed on other grounds sub nom. Korn v. Franchard
Corp., 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971). On the other hand, a company can be held liable
for a statement in a newspaper article that repeats misstatements in a document filed
with the Commission. See, eg., Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F. Supp. 255, 263 (D. Or. 1972)
(treating article repeating statements from Interim Report as if it were calculated to
influence); cf. SEC v. Century Inv. Transfer Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 193,232, at 91,443 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (stating that publicizing a
merger and not publcizing its subsequent abandonment may be misleading); SEC v.
Electrogen Indus., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 192,156, at
96,716-19 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (stating that distributing brochures that contain misrepre-
sentations may actively mislead investors). Similarly, an issuer can be held liable for
an inaccurate earnings projection made by its underwriter and marketmaker and pub-
licly discussed in the presence of its officers. Green v. Jonhop, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 413,
419-420 (D. Or. 1973); cf. In re Tune Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1252
(S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993):
Only statements attributable to the defendants, or omissions by them, can
support the claims against them .... [N]either the alleged statements by
anonymous Tune Warner sources which are quoted in the complaint nor
analysts' and journalists' reports allegedly based on information gleaned
from Time Warner sources may be attributed to the defendants.
1982 [Vol. 63
SOFT INFORMATION REVOLUTION
The Commission also could address an issuer's duty to correct a
forward-looking statement. Rule 10b-5 requires the issuer "to state
[any] material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading."'  The Commission frequently has identified a duty to cor-
rect statements made in any filing that "either have become
inaccurate by virtue of subsequent events, or are later discovered to
have been false and misleading from the outset, and the issuer knows
or should know that persons are continuing to rely on all or any mate-
rial portion of the statements."' 9
Similarly, the cases have recognized that a company's failure to cor-
rect the misleading impression left by statements already made consti-
tutes a fraud. 0 This duty has been held to exist as long as prior
Id. at 1258-59; see also In re Caere Corporate Sec. Litig., 837 F. Supp. 1054, 1056-57
(N.D. Cal. 1993) (dismissing claim that did not adequately plead sufficient entangle-
ment of an issuer with analysts' forecasts).
228. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b(5) (1994).
229. Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Exchange Act Release No. 15,944, [1979
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,117, at 81,943 (June 25, 1979); see also
National Tel. Co. Investigation, Exchange Act Release No. 14,380, [1977-1978 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 81,410, at 88,877 (Jan. 16, 1978) (reporting an
investigation into the activities of the company's outside directors); Notice of Adop-
tion of an Amendment to Rule 14a-9, Exchange Act Release No. 12,371, [1975-1976
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 80,461, at 86, 200 (Apr.23, 1976) ("[T]his
responsibility may extend to situations where management knows its previously dis-
closed assessments no longer have a reasonable basis."); Timely Disclosure of Mate-
rial Corporate Developments, Exchange Act Release No. 8995, [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 77,915, at 80,035 (Oct. 15, 1970) (stating that a
company that has complied with the reporting requirements "still has an obligation to
make full and prompt announcement of material facts regarding the company's finan-
cial condition").
230. Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 1990); Hudson v. Phillips
Petroleum Co. (In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig.), 881 F.2d 1236, 1245 (3d Cir.
1989) (holding that notice of change of intention must be disseminated in a timely
fashion); SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1095 & n.14 (2d Cir. 1972)
(holding that material changes after an offering becomes effective must be brought to
investors' attention); Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 758 (3d Cir. 1984)
("[I]f a corporation voluntarily makes a public statement that is correct when issued,
it has a duty to update that statement if it becomes materially misleading in light of
subsequent events."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985); Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc. v.
Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 425 F.2d 842, 845 (2d ir. 1970) (offering defendants
opportunity to correct misstatements).
With respect to accountants, see liT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 927 (2d Cir. 1980)
("Accountants do have a duty to take reasonable steps to correct misstatements they
have discovered in previous financial statements on which they know the public is
relying."); Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 761 (2d Cir. 1977) (dictum); United States
v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311, 319 (2d Cir. 1975) ("The accountant has a duty to correct the
earlier financial statement which he had audited himself and upon which he had is-
sued his certificate, when he discovers 'that the figures in the annual report were
substantially false and misleading,' and he has a chance to correct them."), cert. de-
nied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976).
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statements remain "alive."'" The courts have not been particularly
precise as to how long that period will be.232
Under rule 13d-2(a), an amendment must be filed "promptly" to
disclose any material changes that occur in a Schedule 13D filing.233
The appropriate time frame may vary from case to case. Factors such
as the degree of deviation and the amount of time elapsed between
the making of the statement and the occurrence of the subsequent
event may affect whether a statement has become materially
misleading.' 4
The Commission also should offer commentary concerning the lifes-
pan of a forward-looking statement and accompanying risks and as-
sumptions disclosure, how promptly statements need to be
corrected 235 and the mechanics of how corrective disclosure should be
made. The Commission should restrict its discussion concerning for-
ward-looking statements and accompanying risks and assumptions to
written statements. If a basic purpose of publishing an interpretative
release is to facilitate judicial dismissal of nonmeritorious suits (or to
231. Ross v. A. H. Robins Co., 465 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding
defendants liable for failure to correct prospectus and annual reports to stockhold-
ers), rev'd on other grounds, 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946
(1980).
232. In Ross v. A. H. Robins, Co., the court explained:
Both section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are silent as to the effect of time on the
duty to correct, but logic compels the conclusion that time may render state-
ments immaterial and end any duty to correct or revise them. In measuring
the effect of time in a particular instance, the type of later information and
the importance of earlier information contained in a prior statement must be
considered. Thus, general financial information in a two-year-old annual re-
port may be stale and immaterial. However, no general rule of time can be
applied to all circumstances. Rather, a "particular duty to correct a specific
prior statement exists as long as traders in the market could reasonably rely
on the statement."
465 F. Supp. at 908 (citations omitted).
In Ross, the court concluded that the 1970 statements of a pharmaceutical manufac-
turer concerning clinical data about one of its products would still be actionable in
1974 when "[t]he mere passage of time would not alone deter the trader in the market
from relying on these statements." Id. Accord Kamerman v. Steinberg, 123 F.R.D. 66
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that voluntary public statements must be corrected if failure
to do so would be misleading).
233. Cf. In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1246 (3d Cir. 1989)
("[Tihe question of whether an amendment is sufficiently prompt must be determined
in each case based upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding both prior
disclosures by the acquirer and the material changes which trigger the obligation to
amend.").
234. Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Exchange Act Release No. 6084, [1979
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,117, at 81,938-45 (June 25, 1979).
235. For example, does the initial preparation of an internal earnings estimate or
construction costs estimate mandate disclosure or can a corporation wait until a re-
view process is completed? Cf Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509,
516 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that tentative statements of nuclear reactor costs need
not be disclosed unless the figures are so definite as to make the published estimate
misleading).
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deter their filing), this goal may be difficult to achieve with oral state-
ments (where there are often fact controversies as to what was said).
The courts have evolved a doctrine sometimes called "justifiable reli-
ance," under which they generally have precluded a plaintiff from re-
lying on an oral statement in contradiction to a written statement.21
This approach seems particularly apposite to forward-looking state-
ments both because written statements are better evidence than mem-
ories of oral statements" 7 and because of the improbability that an
appropriately detailed discussion of risks and assumptions will be
communicated orally.
2. Advantages of Release
A detailed Commission release addressing risks and assumptions
disclosure offers several advantages. First, issuers and registrants
would maintain control over how detailed their disclosure of risks and
assumptions would be. Issuers would have the ability to opt in or out
of different types of disclosure based on their evaluation of business
competition and other factors that bear on voluntary disclosure
decisions.
Second, the approach could provide detailed interpretative gui-
dance to issuers with respect to each type of mandatory and hortatory
forward-looking statement identified in Commission rules and guides.
The advice might be accompanied by illustrations of what the Com-
mission considers appropriate risks and assumptions disclosure in spe-
cific circumstances. The use of illustrations is a technique often used
236. See, eg., Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., Inc., 814 F.2d 798, 804 (1st Cir. 1987)
(citing factors used by courts in examining whether reliance on misrepresentations is
justified); see also Atari Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 981 F.2d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 1992)
(finding merger participants' continued reliance on patently inaccurate financial infor-
mation to be unjustified); Davidson v. Wilson, 973 F.2d 1391, 1400-01 (8th Cir. 1992)
(finding that sophisticated investors with access to relevant information and opportu-
nity to discover fraud did not reasonably rely on misstatements); Myers v. Fmkle, 950
F.2d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 1991) (charging investors with constructive knowledge of risks
and warnings contained in private placement memoranda); Bruschi v. Brown, 876
F.2d 1526, 1529-30 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding that longstanding financial advisor de-
frauded unsophisticated client using alleged oral misrepresentations); Jackvony v.
RIHT Fn. Corp., 873 F.2d 411, 416-17 (1st Cir. 1989) (rejecting investors' right to rely
on oral statements that were specifically excluded from subsequent written agree-
ment); Grubb v. FDIC, 868 F.2d, 1151, 1164 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding that a sophisti-
cated investor could claim fraud when there was little access to information, little
opportunity to discover fraud and other party made specific misrepresentations);
Wilico Kuwait (Trading) S.A.K. v. deSavary, 843 F.2d 618, 623 (1st Cir. 1988) (discuss-
ing whether misrepresentations about a company's poor financial condition were
made and whether plaintiff could justifiably rely on these misrepresentations); One-
O-One Enters. v. Caruso, 848 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that an
integration clause in the final agreement precluded a claim of reasonable reliance on
oral statements).
237. Cf Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,743 (1975) (criticiz-
ing "hazy issues of historical fact the proof of which depended almost entirely on oral
testimony").
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by the Financial Accounting Standards Board when it interprets ac-
counting standards." s This technique would allow the Commission to
offer illustrative advice on a common form of statement without rig-
idly binding the agency with respect to its analysis of other types of
risks and assumptions.
Third, a key advantage of an interpretative release is that it could
shift the focus of the analysis of the appropriateness of forward-look-
ing statements, risks, and assumptions from court proceedings to the
Commission. The SEC long has displayed considerable ability in
helping issuers and registrants avoid litigation through such extrajudi-
cial techniques as no-action or interpretative letters.239 This type of
correspondence could usefully be employed to provide issuers and
registrants an ongoing gauge of the staff's views on evolving disclo-
sure issues concerning forward-looking statements.
C. The Inadequacy of Other Approaches
1. Safe Harbor Rules
Compared to an interpretative release, any safe harbor for forward-
looking statements will provide limited guidance as to how an issuer
or registrant can appropriately disclose the risks and assumptions un-
derlying a forward-looking statement.240 A detailed interpretative re-
lease would reduce the need for further insulation of issuers and
registrants from civil liability for forward-looking statements. The
Commission does not write on a clear slate in this area. Quite aside
from the adoption by eight circuits of the "bespeaks caution" doe-
trine,241 the Supreme Court has issued several opinions that have nar-
rowed the contours of civil rule 10b-5 liability. Notably, the Court has
held:
(1) Private standing under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 is limited to
actual purchasers or sellers.242
(2) A private claim for damages under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
may not lie in the absence of an allegation of intent to deceive, manip-
ulate, or defraud on the part of the defendant. 43 An allegation of
negligence is insufficient to support such a claim.2 " The Court re-
served and continues to reserve the question of whether recklessness
will suffice.24 5
238. See, e.g., FASB Working on Illustrations for Statement 119, Lucas Says, 26 See.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1556 (Nov. 18, 1994) (reporting that the FASB is
researching examples to clarify its disclosure standard for derivative instruments).
239. See 1 Loss & Seligman, supra note 1, at 525 n.29.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 91-127.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 191-222.
242. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-55 (1975).
243. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197-99, 214 (1976).
244. See id. at 199-211.
245. See id. at 194 n.12.
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(3) A breach of fiduciary duty alone will not violate section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5. There must be proof of fraud.2-6
(4) In 1991 the Supreme Court adopted a one-year-after-discovery
rule and a three-years-after-violation statute of limitations for rule
10b-5 litigation that in most cases shortened the earlier applicable lim-
itations period. 47
(5) In 1994, the Court held that a private plaintiff could not main-
tain an aiding and abetting suit under section 10(b). 248
In addition, a substantial percentage of federal securities class ac-
tions recently have been dismissed on a pretrial motion.24 9
The cumulative effect of these Supreme Court and lower federal
court decisions should discourage the filing of nonmeritorious civil
federal securities claims. There are broader concerns at stake, how-
ever, in evaluating the wisdom of encouraging or discouraging civil
federal securities litigation. Such litigation provides a means of pri-
vate enforcement of the federal securities laws' mandatory disclosure
system. This system is usually defended in terms of deterring fraud,
reducing excessive insider or financial intermediary compensation,
and increasing public confidence in the securities market. A further
justification advanced is that of necessity, given the historical perform-
ance of voluntary, state law, and securities market disclosure re-
gimes 50 The information provided by the SEC's disclosure system
can be likened to a public good that would be underprovided, because
of its nonexcludability, but for the securities laws' mandatory require-
ments."' A practical consequence of addressing the market failure
implicit in the nonexcludability of information is a general improve-
ment in the allocative efficiency of investment.'
The mandatory disclosure system also may have attributed to
higher levels of aggregate investment in United States securities. Ac-
cording to the New York Stock Exchange, over fifty-one million
United States citizens directly owned corporate stock in 1990.253 This
figure represented approximately 21.1% of the total population in
1990,- and was over thirty times greater than the 1.5 million persons
246. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977).
247. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson et al., 501 U.S. 350,
361-62 (1991).
248. Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
249. Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor Grundfes's
"Disimplying Private Rights of Action under the Federal Securities Laws: The Com-
mission's Authority", 108 Harv. L. Rev. 438, 446 (1994) (summarizing data). The pre-
cise percentage is open to debate. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108
Harv. L. Rev. 727, 736-37 (1995).
250. 1 Loss & Seligman, supra note 1, at 193.
251. John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 Va. L. Rev. 717, 725 (1984).
252. Id. at 734-37.
253. See N.Y. Stock Exch., Fact Book for the Year 1992, at 70 (1993).
254. See N.Y. Stock Exch., Shareownership 1990, at 10 (1990).
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(equal to 1.2% of the population)' 5 who owned stock in 1929, on the
eve of federal securities regulation.-5 6
Given the limited Commission resources available for the enforce-
ment of its mandatory disclosure system, private litigation has been
recognized as performing a useful augmentative deterrent,2s 7 as well
as compensatory,2 s role. If the mandatory disclosure system is worth
preserving, the Commission should seek to ensure that reductions in
the effectiveness of private federal securities litigation do not produce
a corresponding weakening of the disclosure system. This weakness is
potentially the most serious consequence of restrictions in the private
enforcement of the federal securities laws.259
Finally, the Commission's authority to adopt safe harbor provisions
to insulate issuers and registrants from civil liability for forward-look-
ing statements is a limited one. Rule 175 of the Securities Act of 1933
and rule 3b-6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are definitional
rules, adopted under section 19(a) of the 1933 Act and sections 3(b)
and 23(a)(1) of the 1934 Act, specifying when forward-looking state-
ments shall not be deemed fraudulent. Unlike other safe harbor pro-
visions, which do not purport to exempt transactions from civil
liability, but only from registration requirements,2 60 the forward-look-
ing statement safe harbor rules do not acknowledge any restrictions in
their scope, either in the text of the rules or the adoption release. 261
Nonetheless, the structure of the federal securities laws places some
limits on the rulemaking authority of the Commission. Section 19(a)
of the 1933 Act, for example, restricts the Commission's rulemaking
authority to that "necessary to carry out the provisions of this title."
Sections 3(b) and 23(a)(1) of the 1934 Act contain similar formulae. 62
In one recent decision, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
struck down former rule 19c-4 when it viewed that Rule as exceeding
255. World Almanac and Book of Facts 1995, at 377 (1994).
256. S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934).
257. Private Litigation under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1993) (statement of Willam R. McLucas, Director, Div. of En-
forcement, SEC).
258. 10 Loss & Seligman, supra note 1, at 4578-80.
259. For further discussion of the debate concerning the need for further restric-
tions on federal securities class actions, see Grundfest, supra note 249; Joel Seligman,
The Merits Still Matter: A Rejoinder to Professor Grundfest's Comment, Why Dis-
imply?, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 748 (1995); Seligman, supra note 249.
260. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501 Prelim. Note 1, 230.144A Prelim. Note 1 (1994).
261. See Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Exchange Act Release No. 15,944, [1979
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,117, at 81,938 (June 25, 1979).
262. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1988). Section 3(b) limits the Com-
mission's authority to definitions adopted "consistently with the provisions and pur-
poses of this chapter." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(b) (1988).
Section 23(a)(1) appears to be somewhat broader when it refers to the adoption of
rules "necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this chapter." Id.
§ 78w(a)(1).
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the Commission's authority to adopt an initiative "in furtherance of
the purposes of [the Exchange Act]."' ' 0
Rule 3b-6 seemingly conflicts with the materiality and culpability
standards that the Supreme Court applies when interpreting antifraud
provisions such as rule 10b-5 or 14a-9. Where, for example, the
Supreme Court has defined materiality to embrace "statements of rea-
sons, opinions, or belief" under rule 14a-9,264 rule 3b-6 only applies to
certain filings with the Commission. Rule 3b-6 does not appear to
preclude other types of forward-looking statements from being held
actionable.
More significantly, while the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder265 held that section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 require an allega-
tion of scienter and specifically rejected negligence as an adequate
pleading of culpability,211 rule 3b-6 appears to embrace precisely such
a negligence standard when it requires a plaintiff to prove that a for-
ward-looking statement "was made or reaffirmed without a reason-
able basis. 26 7 In Ernst & Ernst, the Supreme Court emphasized that
the Commission's rulemaking authority under section 10(b) could not
be extended to activities that do not involve scienter.3 As a result of
this holding, the Commission lacks the authority, under general
rulemaking provisions, to change the culpability provision of a specific
section such as § 10(b). Hence, it should hardly be a surprise to the
Commission269 that the lower federal courts often have declined to
rely on rule 3b-6 when that rule has been implicated in rule 10b-5
litigation. 270
A few proposals currently before the Commission attempt to
change the elements of rule 10b-5 liability through safe harbor pro-
posals.27' I am skeptical that either existing rule 3b-6 or these propos-
263. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (emphasis
omitted).
264. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1091 (1991).
265. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
266. Id. at 212-14.
267. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (1994).
268. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 212-14. Pointedly, the Supreme Court added:
"The rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency charged with the admin-
istration of a federal statute is not the power to make law." Id. at 213.
269. Cf. Safe Harbor for Forward Looking Statements, Exchange Act Release No.
34,831, [Current Volume] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '1 85,436, at 85,786 n.65 (Oct. 13,
1994) (citing three rule lOb-5 cases where courts declined to refer to rule 3b-6
although it was implicated).
270. The Seventh Circuit's reliance on rule 175 in Wielgos v. Commonwealth
Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 513-16 (7th Cir. 1989), a § 11 case, presents a closer ques-
tion of applicability since the term "reasonable basis" in rule 175 may be viewed as a
synonym for such terms as "reasonable investigation" in § 11 of the 1933 Act.
271. See, eg., Heightened Definition Proposal-Business Roundtable and National
Association of Manufacturers, reprinted in Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking State-
ments, Exchange Act Release No. 34,831, [1994 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCH) 1 85,436, at 85,794-96 (Oct. 13, 1994); (proposing to require actual reliance);
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als can, under existing precedent, administratively alter the elements
of a rule 10b-5 claim. The Commission does appear, however, to pos-
sess the authority to adopt rule 3b-6 as a safe harbor from the initia-
tion of a Commission proceeding for those firms that comply with the
conditions of that rule.
2. Disimplication
Other proposals before the Commission would disimply 72 private
causes of action for forward-looking statements in specified circum-
stances.273 Given the Supreme Court's discussion of the Commis-
sion's rulemaking authority in Ernst & Ernst v.Hochfelder2 74 and court
decisions implying a private cause of action under rule 10b-5, 75 I am
skeptical that the Commission could retain such rules as 10b-5, but
partially disimply from that rule civil liability for forward-looking
statements. The Commission could disimply civil liability under rule
10b-5 if it were willing to totally rescind the rule. The Commission
could then reenact the substance of rule 10b-5 under another section
of the federal securities acts that does not imply private causes of ac-
tions. Disimplication could, therefore, be achieved by mechanical
means.
Nonetheless, it would be unwise for the Commission to pursue such
an approach. Disimplication would have a greater capacity to pre-
clude private federal securities litigation than would a broader safe
harbor for forward-looking statements. Given the uncertainty as to a
need for further changes in the contours of private federal securities
litigation, disimplication would appear unwise at this juncture. Even
the leading proponent of disimplication has acknowledged: "At the
end of the day, and despite recent congressional hearings, we simply
do not know enough about the securities litigation process to pro-
pound categorical reforms with any degree of confidence that we
would be doing more good than harm. '276 To preserve the integrity
of the Commission's mandatory disclosure system, it would be wiser
cf. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988) (permitting reliance to be pre-
sumed in specific circumstances).
Former Commissioner Beese's Business Judgment Rule proposal is susceptible to
the same criticism. See Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-831, [1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,436, at
85,788 (Oct. 13, 1994).
272. The term "disimply" is used in this arena to mean "redefine through the
rulemaking process." Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action
under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 Harv. L. Rev.
961, 963 (1994).
273. The most thoughtful analysis of this approach appears in Grundfest, supra
note 272, at 1011-15.
274. 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1976).
275. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty, 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9(1971) ("It is now established that a private right of action is implied under § 10(b).").
276. Grundfest, supra note 249, at 747.
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for the agency to proceed with the precision and detail that an inter-
pretative release approach can offer. The ultimate risk of disimplica-
tion is that it will prevent meritorious as well as nonmeritorious
private litigation from going forward. This situation could result in
the underdeterrence of securities fraud. Underdeterrence is particu-
larly a risk with respect to overly optimistic forward-looking
statements.
CONCLUSION
The Securities Act of 1933, in part, was adopted because of the
prevalence of unsubstantiated forward-looking statements.277 Recent
Commission experience in such areas of exemption as municipal se-
curities suggests that the capacity of issuers and registrants to issue
securities without adequate disclosure has not vanished.2 78 The Com-
mission would be wise to proceed with measured incremental steps in
areas where the risk of fraud is real.
277. See Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure
System, 9 J. Corp. L. 1, 23-33 (1983).
278. See 3 Loss & Seligman, supra note 1, at 1159-73 (discussing, in passing, the
New York City bond crisis of 1974-75 and the Washington Public Power Supply
System).
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